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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that The Yogācāra ālayavijñāna posited to account for causal continuity between mental streams is functionally indistinguishable from a Pudgalavādin substantial self, which Yogācārins themselves reject as ontologically incoherent.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Ālayavijñāna is explicitly a consciousness (vijñāna), not a substance; pudgala is a non-conscious substantial entity—different ontological categories.
      ?

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    • 2.Yogācāra treats ālayavijñāna as conventional designation without intrinsic nature, while rejecting pudgala as positing independent ontological reality.
      ?

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    • 3.Functional equivalence in explaining causal continuity doesn't entail equivalence in metaphysical status if one is designated and one is reified.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Both ālayavijñāna and pudgala function as substrates persisting across rebirth to explain karmic continuity without a permanent soul.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Yogācāra denies ālayavijñāna has intrinsic essence, yet it grounds identity conditions in ways functionally equivalent to substantial selfhood.
      ?

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    • 3.If two entities serve identical causal roles in a system, rejecting one while accepting the other requires principled distinction beyond function.
      ?

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