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    There are no plural entities. — Carmelics
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    Home/Modality & Possibility
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    There are no plural entities.

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.There are no singular entities.
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    • 2.Being singular and being plural are essentially interdependent — a plural entity is simply a singular entity assembled.
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    • 3.If there are no singular entities, there can be no plural entities, since plural entities presuppose the existence of singulars.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Wholes possess emergent causal powers that their constituent parts individually lack, as argued by proponents of mereological universalism.
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    • 2.An entity with novel causal powers irreducible to its parts constitutes a genuinely distinct plural entity, not merely a convenient fiction.
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    • 3.Therefore, plural entities exist as causally efficacious wholes, independent of whether their constituent singulars are themselves ultimately real.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition posits that composite wholes (avayavin) are ontologically distinct substances from their parts, with samavāya (inherence) as a real relation.
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    • 2.If inherence is a genuine ontological category binding parts into a whole, then the whole has independent existence not reducible to its components, refuting the interdependence premise in Argument 1.
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    Topics

    Modality & PossibilityTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

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    Philosophy of Language2 linked

    Related

    An entity with novel causal powers irreducible to its parts constitutes a genuin...Being singular and being plural are essentially interdependent — a plural entity...If inherence is a genuine ontological category binding parts into a whole, then ...If there are no singular entities, there can be no plural entities, since plural...
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    The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition posits that composite wholes (avayavin) are ontolo...There are no singular entities.Therefore, plural entities exist as causally efficacious wholes, independent of ...Wholes possess emergent causal powers that their constituent parts individually ...

    Similar

    There are no singular entities.92%If there are no singular entities, there can be no plural entities, si...87%All phenomena lack any plural identity84%Being singular and being plural are essentially interdependent — a plu...81%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: twotruths-india
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    The premise that shows the lack of plurality is based upon the conclusion of the argument that shows the lack of singularity. This is so, argues Śāntarakṣita, because “When we analyse any entity, none is [found] to be a singular. For that for which nothing is singular, there must also be nothing which is plural” ([MAK] 61, Dbu ma sa 55a). This argument of Śāntarakṣita proceeds from understanding that being singular and being plural (manifold) are essentially interdependent—if there are no singul
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit