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    There exist metaphysically possible instances of kind C t... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→The descriptive view is refuted if there are metaphysically possible instances of kind C that do not possess the property complex D.

    There exist metaphysically possible instances of kind C that do not possess the property complex D.

    Modality & PossibilityPhilosophy of Language
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    Philosophy of LanguageModality & Possibility

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    If (K) is necessary, then no metaphysically possible instance of C can lack D.If D is constitutive of the meaning of 'C', then the statement 'All C are D' (K)...The descriptive view is refuted if there are metaphysically possible instances o...

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    There exist metaphysically possible items that possess the property co...94%The descriptive view is refuted if there are metaphysically possible i...89%The descriptive view is refuted if there are metaphysically possible i...80%A particular property instance cannot exist without the substance of w...79%

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    Since D is constitutive of the meaning of ‘C’, (K) should be analytic and so necessary. The descriptive view would thus be refuted either by (i) metaphysically possible instances of the kind C that do not possess the property complex D or by (ii) metaphysically possible items that do possess the property complex D without being instances of C.

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