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    The descriptive view is refuted if there are metaphysical... — Carmelics
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    The descriptive view is refuted if there are metaphysically possible instances of kind C that do not possess the property complex D.

    Modality & PossibilityPhilosophy of Language
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke's modal argument shows that terms like 'water' rigidly designate their referents across possible worlds, independent of any associated description.
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    • 2.A rigid designator picks out the same entity in all possible worlds, so 'water' refers to H2O even in worlds where H2O lacks properties we associate with water.
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    • 3.Therefore, a possible world containing XYZ with all water's surface properties but lacking H2O structure contains no water, refuting D-based descriptivism.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Putnam's Twin Earth argument demonstrates that natural kind terms have their extensions fixed by the actual constitution of paradigm samples, not by speakers' descriptive knowledge.
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    • 2.Since extension is fixed by causal-historical baptism of samples rather than descriptions, possible instances sharing all of D but lacking actual microstructure fall outside the kind's extension.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.If D is constitutive of the meaning of 'C', then the statement 'All C are D' (K) should be analytic and therefore necessary.
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    • 2.If (K) is necessary, then no metaphysically possible instance of C can lack D.
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    • 3.There exist metaphysically possible instances of kind C that do not possess the property complex D.
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    Philosophy of LanguageModality & Possibility

    Related

    A rigid designator picks out the same entity in all possible worlds, so 'water' ...If (K) is necessary, then no metaphysically possible instance of C can lack D.If D is constitutive of the meaning of 'C', then the statement 'All C are D' (K)...Kripke's modal argument shows that terms like 'water' rigidly designate their re...
    +4 moreShow less
    Putnam's Twin Earth argument demonstrates that natural kind terms have their ext...Since extension is fixed by causal-historical baptism of samples rather than des...There exist metaphysically possible instances of kind C that do not possess the ...Therefore, a possible world containing XYZ with all water's surface properties b...

    Similar

    The descriptive view is refuted if there are metaphysically possible i...92%There exist metaphysically possible instances of kind C that do not po...89%There exist metaphysically possible items that possess the property co...86%Species are not natural kinds, or the view that kindhood is fixed by i...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: natural-kinds
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    Since D is constitutive of the meaning of ‘C’, (K) should be analytic and so necessary. The descriptive view would thus be refuted either by (i) metaphysically possible instances of the kind C that do not possess the property complex D or by (ii) metaphysically possible items that do possess the property complex D without being instances of C.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit