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    There is no such thing as bare identity — identity must a... — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    There is no such thing as bare identity — identity must always be identity under some concept

    Personal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.When any a and b are asserted to be the same thing, they must be the same something-or-other
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    • 2.The something-or-other must be a kind concept that answers 'what is it?' questions
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Numerical identity ('a = a') is a purely logical relation that holds between an entity and itself prior to any conceptual sorting.
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    • 2.Frege's Begriffsschrift demonstrates that identity statements are well-formed in first-order logic without invoking sortals or kind concepts.
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    • 3.If identity were always concept-relative, the transitivity and reflexivity of '=' would require qualification by a concept, collapsing into mere equivalence relations.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Wiggins's own sortal dependency thesis conflates epistemic conditions for identifying x with metaphysical conditions for x being identical to itself.
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    • 2.Even if we require a sortal to re-identify an object across time, synchronic numerical identity at a single moment presupposes no such concept.
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    • 3.Geach's relative identity thesis, which this claim inherits, leads to the paradox that a and b can be the same F but different G's, violating Leibniz's Law.
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    Topics

    Personal IdentityPhilosophy of Language

    Related

    Even if we require a sortal to re-identify an object across time, synchronic num...Frege's Begriffsschrift demonstrates that identity statements are well-formed in...Geach's relative identity thesis, which this claim inherits, leads to the parado...If identity were always concept-relative, the transitivity and reflexivity of '=...
    +4 moreShow less
    Numerical identity ('a = a') is a purely logical relation that holds between an ...The something-or-other must be a kind concept that answers 'what is it?' questio...When any a and b are asserted to be the same thing, they must be the same someth...Wiggins's own sortal dependency thesis conflates epistemic conditions for identi...

    Similar

    Personal identity cannot be based on any single idea or emotion82%Formal identity entails real (or essential) identity81%Constitution is absolute identity.80%God is the ultimate ground of criteria of identity for all things80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: substance
    View source passageHide passage
    Wiggins assumes that individuating a temporally enduring object involves being able to re-identify it at different times and under different descriptions. This assumption makes it possible to state substance individuation using the language of identity. Within the scope of this assumption, he makes two claims. The first is the sortal relativity of identity: that is, when any a and b are asserted to be the same thing, they must be the same something-or-other, and the something-or-other must be th
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit