Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    When any a and b are asserted to be the same thing, they ... — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→There is no such thing as bare identity — identity must always be identity under some concept

    When any a and b are asserted to be the same thing, they must be the same something-or-other

    Personal IdentityPhilosophy of Language
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Personal IdentityPhilosophy of Language

    Related

    The something-or-other must be a kind concept that answers 'what is it?' questio...There is no such thing as bare identity — identity must always be identity under...

    Similar

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Personal Identity
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Two entities a and b can differ while still being partially identical.83%If we are blind to the difference between a and b but the Martians are...81%An entity a is non-identical with b if and only if there is no form F ...81%Any two existing things must be either identical or distinct.80%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: substance
    View source passageHide passage
    Wiggins assumes that individuating a temporally enduring object involves being able to re-identify it at different times and under different descriptions. This assumption makes it possible to state substance individuation using the language of identity. Within the scope of this assumption, he makes two claims. The first is the sortal relativity of identity: that is, when any a and b are asserted to be the same thing, they must be the same something-or-other, and the something-or-other must be th

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective