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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
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    321,452
    Perspectives
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    42
    There may be no fact of the matter about whether a subjec... — Carmelics
    Home/Skepticism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    There may be no fact of the matter about whether a subject really believes a given proposition P

    Skepticism
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Multiple incompatible interpretive schemes can be equally good in at least some cases
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    • 2.Whether a subject believes P depends on which interpretive scheme is applied
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    • 3.If no interpretive scheme is uniquely correct, there is no determinate fact about the belief attribution
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Functional states that systematically cause behavior constitute real mental states regardless of interpretive underdetermination.
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    • 2.Belief attribution tracks causally efficacious internal states, not merely observer-relative interpretive frameworks.
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    • 3.Fodor's computational representationalism identifies beliefs with syntactically structured states whose causal powers are intrinsic, not interpretation-dependent.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Quine's own indeterminacy thesis applies to translation schemes, not to the existence of dispositions that ground assent behavior.
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    • 2.Even under radical interpretation, Davidson's principle of charity converges on a uniquely rational belief set, dissolving apparent underdetermination.
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    Topics

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    2 topics

    Philosophy of Language3 linkedConsciousness & Mind1 linked

    Related

    Belief attribution tracks causally efficacious internal states, not merely obser...Even under radical interpretation, Davidson's principle of charity converges on ...Fodor's computational representationalism identifies beliefs with syntactically ...Functional states that systematically cause behavior constitute real mental stat...
    +4 moreShow less
    If no interpretive scheme is uniquely correct, there is no determinate fact abou...Multiple incompatible interpretive schemes can be equally good in at least some ...Quine's own indeterminacy thesis applies to translation schemes, not to the exis...

    Similar

    No one can know a proposition that is false84%Knowledge requires there to be true propositions about the subject mat...84%A proposition can be true or false without entailing the existence of ...84%A proposition that S does not believe cannot be a fact that S knows.83%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: belief
    View source passageHide passage
    Dennett and Davidson both endorse the “indeterminacy” of belief attributions: In at least some cases, multiple incompatible interpretive schemes may be equally good, and thus there may be no fact of the matter which of those schemes is “really” the correct one, and thus whether the subject “really” believes P, if belief that P is attributed by one scheme but not by the other.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    Whether a subject believes P depends on which interpretive scheme is applied
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit