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    Therefore, a second divine principle can remain a necessa... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→A second god cannot be a necessary condition of the existence of at least one concrete object distinct from itself, given that a first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of at least one contingent being.

    Therefore, a second divine principle can remain a necessary condition for specific constitutive features of contingent beings even when a first divine principle is sufficient for their bare existence.

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    Key Terms

    Bare existence(metaphysics)
    The simple fact that something exists, without considering any of its special qualities or features.
    Divine principle(as what both Aristotle and Spinoza are trying to describe)
    The ultimate reality or highest form of being that a philosophy recognizes—often what that philosophy calls God or the fundamental force behind everything.
    constitutive features(as used in philosophy and cognitive science)
    Essential, built-in characteristics that are fundamental to something's nature—not accidents or bugs, but core parts of what something is.
    contingent beings(Modal metaphysics)
    Beings whose existence is not necessary — they exist but could have failed to exist
    necessary condition

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    (Counterfactual analysis of causation; Mackie 1965, 1974)
    A condition C is necessary for event E if E would not have occurred in the absence of C
    sufficient condition(Used in the context of whether intrinsic properties can define species membership)
    A property whose presence guarantees membership in or applicability of a category, such that having the property entails belonging to the species or class

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    Against an aspect of God1 linkedDivine Attributes1 linked

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    A second god cannot be a necessary condition of the existence of at least one co...

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