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    A second god cannot be a necessary condition of the exist... — Carmelics
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    A second god cannot be a necessary condition of the existence of at least one concrete object distinct from itself, given that a first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of at least one contingent being.

    Against an aspect of GodDivine Attributes
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.The first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of at least one contingent being.
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    • 2.If the first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of at least one contingent being, then the second god is not a necessary condition of the existence of at least one concrete object distinct from itself.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Causal sufficiency in a deterministic sense does not preclude the logical possibility that a second deity's sustaining activity is metaphysically necessary for continued existence.
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    • 2.Leibniz's distinction between sufficient reason for origination and sufficient reason for continuation implies that a cause sufficient to produce a being need not be sufficient to preserve it.
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    • 3.If a second god is a necessary condition for the persistence of contingent beings, it remains a necessary condition of their existence even when a first god is sufficient for their initiation.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.In Neoplatonic emanationist frameworks, such as those of Plotinus and Proclus, distinct divine principles serve non-redundant causal roles at different ontological levels of reality.
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    • 2.A cause that is sufficient for producing an effect at one level of being need not be sufficient to account for all the structural conditions that make that effect the kind of thing it is.
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    • 3.Therefore, a second divine principle can remain a necessary condition for specific constitutive features of contingent beings even when a first divine principle is sufficient for their bare existence.
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    Topics

    Divine AttributesAgainst an aspect of God

    Key Terms

    causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense)(Used to distinguish a stronger notion of causal sufficiency relevant to divine causation arguments)
    A condition such that its obtaining alone is enough to bring about the existence of a given object, without requiring any further causal contribution.
    concrete object(Foundational primitive in Zalta's system)
    An object that actually exists in the sense captured by the existence predicate E!x; taken as primitive.
    contingent being(Boethius's characterization of human beings to counter necessity-based arguments)
    A being whose existence is not necessary — it can fail to exist
    god (in this context)(as used in metaphysics and theology)
    A supreme, all-powerful being that exists necessarily (meaning it couldn't fail to exist) and may be responsible for creating everything else.
    necessary condition(Counterfactual analysis of causation; Mackie 1965, 1974)
    A condition C is necessary for event E if E would not have occurred in the absence of C
    sufficient condition(Used in the context of whether intrinsic properties can define species membership)
    A property whose presence guarantees membership in or applicability of a category, such that having the property entails belonging to the species or class

    Connections

    1 topic

    Causation1 linked

    Related

    A cause that is sufficient for producing an effect at one level of being need no...Causal sufficiency in a deterministic sense does not preclude the logical possib...If a second god is a necessary condition for the persistence of contingent being...If the first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the...

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: monotheism
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    (1*) is sufficient to yield our conclusion. For if the first god is a causally necessary condition of the existence of every other concrete object, then the second god is not a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of any contingent being. Similarly, if the first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the existence of at least one contingent being, then the second god is not a necessary condition of the existence of at least one concrete ob
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    +4 moreShow less
    In Neoplatonic emanationist frameworks, such as those of Plotinus and Proclus, d...Leibniz's distinction between sufficient reason for origination and sufficient r...The first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense) of the ex...Therefore, a second divine principle can remain a necessary condition for specif...

    Similar

    A second god cannot be a causally sufficient condition (in the strong ...98%If the first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sen...97%If the first god is a causally necessary condition of the existence of...94%The first god is a causally sufficient condition (in the strong sense)...91%
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit