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    Therefore, 'I intend that we X' smuggles a cooperative ou... — Carmelics
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    Supports→Bratman's account of shared intention is defective because intentions of the form 'I intend that we X' violate the condition that one can only intend what one is in a position to settle.

    Therefore, 'I intend that we X' smuggles a cooperative outcome into the content of a unilateral mental state, violating the agential scope that makes intention normatively coherent.

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    Key Terms

    Agential scope(as used in philosophy of action and ethics)
    The range of things that a person can actually control or be responsible for through their own choices and actions.
    Cooperative outcome(as contrasted with conflictual outcomes)
    A result where both sides work together and both benefit, rather than working against each other.
    Intend/Intention(as used in philosophy of action)
    A conscious decision or plan to do something in the future; what you aim to bring about through your own actions.
    Mental state(philosophy of mind)
    A condition of your mind at a particular moment, like believing something, feeling afraid, or having a visual experience.
    Normatively coherent(as used in ethics and philosophy of action)

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    Making sense according to the rules or standards about how someone should act or think; consistent with what we expect of rational agents.
    Unilateral(as used in ethics)
    One-sided; something that goes in only one direction, from one person to another, without requiring the other person to do the same thing back.

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    Philosophy of Language1 linkedMoral Responsibility1 linked

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    Bratman's account of shared intention is defective because intentions of the for...

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