Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Therefore, no effective punishment for defection in the s... — Carmelics
    Home/Moral Responsibility
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→In the second-to-last round of a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, rational players will also defect.

    Therefore, no effective punishment for defection in the second-to-last round is possible.

    Justice & PunishmentMoral Responsibility
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityJustice & Punishment

    Connections

    2 topics

    Consequentialism2 linked

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Moral Responsibility
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Truth & Knowledge
    1 linked

    Related

    In the second-to-last round of a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, rational ...Players expect to defect in the final round regardless of what happens in the se...Utility-maximizing players defect when defection carries no risk of future punis...

    Similar

    In the final round, no future punishment for defection is possible.93%Players expect to defect in the final round regardless of what happens...84%In the second-to-last round of a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma,...80%Because defection is the dominant strategy in every round by backward ...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: game-theory
    View source passageHide passage
    There are two complications. First, the players must be uncertain as to when their interaction ends. Suppose the players know when the last round comes. In that round, it will be utility-maximizing for players to defect, since no punishment will be possible. Now consider the second-last round. In this round, players also face no punishment for defection, since they expect to defect in the last round anyway. So they defect in the second-last round. But this means they face no threat of punishment

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective