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    Made withinDC&Austin
    In the second-to-last round of a finitely repeated Prison... — Carmelics
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    Home/Moral Responsibility
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    In the second-to-last round of a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, rational players will also defect.

    ConsequentialismMoral Responsibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Players expect to defect in the final round regardless of what happens in the second-to-last round.
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    • 2.Therefore, no effective punishment for defection in the second-to-last round is possible.
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    • 3.Utility-maximizing players defect when defection carries no risk of future punishment.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Players with reputational or psychological commitments to cooperation treat defection as costly even in the final rounds.
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    • 2.Gauthier's constrained maximization shows that players disposed to cooperate conditionally outperform straightforward maximizers across iterated interactions.
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    • 3.The backward induction argument assumes common knowledge of rationality, which empirically fails and is contested as a coherent epistemic requirement by Binmore and others.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Selten's 'chain store paradox' literature demonstrates that backward induction conclusions are undermined when players assign non-zero probability to boundedly rational or cooperative opponent types.
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    • 2.If a player believes there is even a small chance their opponent is a 'tit-for-tat' type, defecting in the second-to-last round carries expected costs that can outweigh its gains.
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    Topics

    Moral ResponsibilityConsequentialism

    Connections

    2 topics

    Truth & Knowledge1 linkedJustice & Punishment1 linked

    Related

    Gauthier's constrained maximization shows that players disposed to cooperate con...If a player believes there is even a small chance their opponent is a 'tit-for-t...Players expect to defect in the final round regardless of what happens in the se...Players with reputational or psychological commitments to cooperation treat defe...
    +4 moreShow less
    Selten's 'chain store paradox' literature demonstrates that backward induction c...The backward induction argument assumes common knowledge of rationality, which e...Therefore, no effective punishment for defection in the second-to-last round is ...

    Similar

    In the final round of a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, rational...98%Players expect to defect in the final round regardless of what happens...81%Therefore, no effective punishment for defection in the second-to-last...80%Players in a repeated game may establish commitment by reducing the va...77%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: game-theory
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    There are two complications. First, the players must be uncertain as to when their interaction ends. Suppose the players know when the last round comes. In that round, it will be utility-maximizing for players to defect, since no punishment will be possible. Now consider the second-last round. In this round, players also face no punishment for defection, since they expect to defect in the last round anyway. So they defect in the second-last round. But this means they face no threat of punishment
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Utility-maximizing players defect when defection carries no risk of future punis...
    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit