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    These two conclusions are contradictory — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
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    Challenges→Either the Kripkean argument is incorrect, or replacement of even a single part does not preserve identity

    These two conclusions are contradictory

    Personal Identity
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    Personal Identity

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    Either the Kripkean argument is incorrect, or replacement of even a single part ...

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    The Kripkean argument entails that O and S are not the same ship
    The gradual-replacement argument entails that O and S are the same ship

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    Therefore the view entails Lefty = Righty, which contradicts the fact ...72%This contradicts the claim that x and y are not the same G.71%Given these assumptions, RI and LL cannot both hold in the same framew...70%If two distinct objects are indiscernible, the Weak Principle of the I...69%

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    If we grant that \(O\) and \(S\) cannot be the same ship, we seem to have a solution to the ship of Theseus paradox. By the Kripkean argument, only the reassembled ship has any claim to being the original ship, \(O\). But this success is short lived. For we are left with the following additional paradox: Suppose that \(S\) eventuates from \(O\) by replacing one part of \(O\) one day at a time. There seems to be widespread agreement that replacing just one part of a thing by a new exactly similar

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