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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Either the Kripkean argument is incorrect, or replacement... — Carmelics
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    321,452
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    Home/Personal Identity
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Either the Kripkean argument is incorrect, or replacement of even a single part does not preserve identity

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kripke's modal essentialism entails that origin facts are metaphysically necessary, making even single-part substitution identity-threatening.
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    • 2.If origin essentialism holds, the gradual-replacement argument's conclusion that O equals S merely reflects epistemic tolerance, not metaphysical identity.
      ?

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    • 3.Apparent contradictions between Kripkean and gradual-replacement conclusions dissolve once we distinguish loose, practical identity-talk from strict metaphysical identity.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Chisholm's mereological essentialism entails that any object has all its parts essentially, so single-part replacement produces a numerically distinct object.
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    • 2.If mereological essentialism is true, the gradual-replacement argument's premise that O survives part-substitution is simply false, removing the alleged contradiction.
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    • 3.The apparent force of the gradual-replacement argument depends on the four-dimensionalist conflation of temporal stages with persisting objects, a conflation Kripkean ontology rejects.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.The Kripkean argument entails that O and S are not the same ship
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    • 2.The gradual-replacement argument entails that O and S are the same ship
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    • 3.These two conclusions are contradictory
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    Personal IdentityModality & Possibility

    Related

    Apparent contradictions between Kripkean and gradual-replacement conclusions dis...Chisholm's mereological essentialism entails that any object has all its parts e...If mereological essentialism is true, the gradual-replacement argument's premise...If origin essentialism holds, the gradual-replacement argument's conclusion that...
    +5 moreShow less
    Kripke's modal essentialism entails that origin facts are metaphysically necessa...The Kripkean argument entails that O and S are not the same shipThe apparent force of the gradual-replacement argument depends on the four-dimen...The gradual-replacement argument entails that O and S are the same shipThese two conclusions are contradictory

    Similar

    The Kripkean argument conflicts with the common sense principle that r...89%Sameness of proper parts is not necessary for identity (established by...82%Replacing just one part of a thing by a new exactly similar part prese...80%Therefore, the part of the Form of the F present in A cannot be identi...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: identity-relative
    View source passageHide passage
    If we grant that \(O\) and \(S\) cannot be the same ship, we seem to have a solution to the ship of Theseus paradox. By the Kripkean argument, only the reassembled ship has any claim to being the original ship, \(O\). But this success is short lived. For we are left with the following additional paradox: Suppose that \(S\) eventuates from \(O\) by replacing one part of \(O\) one day at a time. There seems to be widespread agreement that replacing just one part of a thing by a new exactly similar
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit