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    Made withinDC&Austin
    Things in themselves—objects considered qua objects of di... — Carmelics
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    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
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    Home/Perception
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Things in themselves—objects considered qua objects of discursive cognition in general—are not in space.

    Modality & Possibility
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.When objects are considered qua objects of discursive intellect in general rather than our specific discursive intellect, our specific intuitional epistemic conditions (space and time) can no longer be assumed to apply.
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    • 2.Space is an epistemic condition specific to our kind of discursive cognition, not a condition of discursive cognition in general.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Strawson argues in 'The Bounds of Sense' that 'things in themselves' is an incoherent concept produced by illegitimately applying the category of existence beyond possible experience.
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    • 2.If 'things in themselves' cannot coherently be described as existing, claims about their spatial or non-spatial character are equally meaningless rather than informatively negative.
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    • 3.The claim that things-in-themselves are 'not in space' thus smuggles in a substantive characterization of what Kant's own critical constraints forbid us from characterizing at all.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Leibniz held that space is a relational structure grounded in the intrinsic properties of substances, making spatiality a derivative feature of mind-independent monadic reality.
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    • 2.If space is reducible to non-spatial relational properties of things in themselves, then things in themselves are not non-spatial but rather constitute the deeper ground from which spatial structure is abstracted.
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    • 3.P2 of the supporting argument therefore fails: the distinction between our specific intuition and discursive cognition in general does not establish that things-in-themselves lack all spatial or proto-spatial structure.
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    Topics

    PerceptionModality & Possibility

    Connections

    1 topic

    Truth & Knowledge2 linked

    Related

    If 'things in themselves' cannot coherently be described as existing, claims abo...If space is reducible to non-spatial relational properties of things in themselv...Leibniz held that space is a relational structure grounded in the intrinsic prop...P2 of the supporting argument therefore fails: the distinction between our speci...
    +4 moreShow less
    Space is an epistemic condition specific to our kind of discursive cognition, no...Strawson argues in 'The Bounds of Sense' that 'things in themselves' is an incoh...The claim that things-in-themselves are 'not in space' thus smuggles in a substa...When objects are considered qua objects of discursive intellect in general rathe...

    Similar

    When objects are considered qua objects of discursive intellect in gen...86%Empirical objects, considered as objects of our specific kind of discu...84%Premise (6) does not require that it is possible for there to be discu...81%Premise (6) only requires that the concept of discursive cognition as ...79%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: kant-transcendental-idealism
    View source passageHide passage
    This grounds a distinction between two ways of considering the objects of our cognition. When we consider objects qua objects of our cognition, we consider them as falling under the relevant epistemic conditions. If E is an epistemic condition of cognition of objects, then objects must fall under E (i.e., be accurately represented by E); otherwise, in representing them with E, I would not be cognizing objects but misrepresenting them. My representation of objects with E would be an illusion, the
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit