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    Carmelics

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Treating any proposition to which one cannot assign a probability as equally likely to be true as to be false would result in an incoherent assignment of probabilities.

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.The Principle of Indifference (Keynes, Laplace) holds that equal probability assignment over unknown alternatives is a rational epistemic default.
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    • 2.When no evidence favors one proposition over its negation, assigning 0.5 reflects genuine symmetry of ignorance, not incoherence.
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    • 3.Alleged incoherence arises only under inconsistent reference-class partitioning, a solvable technical problem, not a refutation of the principle itself.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
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    • 1.Williamson's epistemic logic and imprecise probability frameworks (Joyce, van Fraassen) allow rational suspension of determinate probability assignment without defaulting to 0.5.
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    • 2.If probability assignments are legitimately indeterminate rather than forced to 0.5, the original claim attacks a position no careful epistemologist actually holds.
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    • 3.The incoherence objection thus defeats a strawman, leaving the genuine skeptical theist move—withholding judgment entirely—untouched.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Propositions vary dramatically in logical form: some are atomic, others are sweeping generalizations, others are complex conjunctions, and so on.
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    • 2.If one treated any proposition to which one could not assign a probability as equally likely to be true as to be false, the result would be an incoherent assignment of probabilities.
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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.