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    Treating any proposition to which one cannot assign a pro... — Carmelics
    Home/Problem of Evil
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Treating any proposition to which one cannot assign a probability as equally likely to be true as to be false would result in an incoherent assignment of probabilities.

    Problem of Evil
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Propositions vary dramatically in logical form: some are atomic, others are sweeping generalizations, others are complex conjunctions, and so on.
      ?

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    • 2.If one treated any proposition to which one could not assign a probability as equally likely to be true as to be false, the result would be an incoherent assignment of probabilities.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.The Principle of Indifference (Keynes, Laplace) holds that equal probability assignment over unknown alternatives is a rational epistemic default.
      ?

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    • 2.When no evidence favors one proposition over its negation, assigning 0.5 reflects genuine symmetry of ignorance, not incoherence.
      ?

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    • 3.Alleged incoherence arises only under inconsistent reference-class partitioning, a solvable technical problem, not a refutation of the principle itself.
      ?

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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Williamson's epistemic logic and imprecise probability frameworks (Joyce, van Fraassen) allow rational suspension of determinate probability assignment without defaulting to 0.5.
      ?

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    • 2.If probability assignments are legitimately indeterminate rather than forced to 0.5, the original claim attacks a position no careful epistemologist actually holds.
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    • 3.The incoherence objection thus defeats a strawman, leaving the genuine skeptical theist move—withholding judgment entirely—untouched.
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    Topics

    Problem of Evil

    Related

    Alleged incoherence arises only under inconsistent reference-class partitioning,...If one treated any proposition to which one could not assign a probability as eq...If probability assignments are legitimately indeterminate rather than forced to ...Propositions vary dramatically in logical form: some are atomic, others are swee...
    +4 moreShow less
    The Principle of Indifference (Keynes, Laplace) holds that equal probability ass...The incoherence objection thus defeats a strawman, leaving the genuine skeptical...When no evidence favors one proposition over its negation, assigning 0.5 reflect...Williamson's epistemic logic and imprecise probability frameworks (Joyce, van Fr...

    Similar

    If one treated any proposition to which one could not assign a probabi...98%Only necessarily false propositions have a probability equal to zero.81%If we cannot determine the probability of the story, then it cannot be...74%The fundamental equiprobability assumption in logical probability need...73%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: evil
    View source passageHide passage
    The question that immediately arises is whether a proposition that would undercut an inductive argument from evil if one knew it were true can undercut the argument if one is unable to assign any probability to the proposition’s being true, and if so, how. One thought might be that if one can assign no probability to a proposition, one should treat it as equally likely to be true as to be false. But propositions vary dramatically in logical form: some are such as might naturally be viewed as atomic, others are sweeping generalizations, others are complex conjunctions, and so on. If one trea...

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit