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    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Treating extinction probability as equivalent to expansion probability at the three-agent threshold conflates single-round payoff structure with iterated game dynamics, a category error Skyrms explicitly warns against in 'Evolution of the Social Contract'.

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    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.The three-agent threshold may generate identical symmetry properties in both game structures, making the distinction between static and iterated logically irrelevant.
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    • 2.Skyrms' warnings about iteration apply to strategy selection, not to mathematical symmetries in payoff equivalence, which remain valid across contexts.
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    • 3.If extinction and expansion probabilities are structurally isomorphic at the threshold, the categorical difference between games becomes descriptive rather than normative.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • 1.Single-round games isolate payoff structures; iterated games introduce history-dependence and strategy evolution that fundamentally alter outcome equivalences.
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    • 2.Skyrms demonstrates that strategies viable in one-shot interactions fail under repetition due to reputation effects and conditional cooperation dynamics.
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    • 3.Treating extinction and expansion as symmetrical ignores that repeated play allows populations to escape low-payoff equilibria unavailable in static analysis.
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