Treating varied pleasant activities as conducive to well-being conflates preferred indifferents (proēgmena adiaphora) with genuine goods, a category error Epictetus explicitly warns against.
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preferred indifferents (proēgmena adiaphora)(as the category of things the statement warns against confusing with genuine goods)
In Stoic philosophy, things that are neither good nor bad in themselves (like health, money, or pleasure) but are naturally preferred because they align with our nature—not true goods that guarantee a good life.
proēgmena adiaphora(as the Greek philosophical terminology)
The Greek Stoic term for 'preferred indifferents'—things we naturally prefer but that don't truly determine whether our life is good or bad.
well-being(Welfarist framework for legal evaluation)
An individual's well-being is identified with her preferences: an individual has greater well-being in state X than in state Y if and only if she prefers state X to state Y