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    Two co-referential names can differ in content — Carmelics
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    Home/Philosophy of Language
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    Two co-referential names can differ in content

    Philosophy of Language
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Names refer to objects via a mode of presentation, called a sense
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    • 2.Two names can present the same referent via different modes of presentation
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    • 3.Difference in mode of presentation constitutes a difference in sense
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Names are directly referential tags whose semantic content is exhausted by their referent, not any associated description or mode of presentation.
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    • 2.If two names share the same referent, they share the same semantic content, and apparent cognitive differences reflect psychology, not semantics.
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    • 3.Kripke's modal argument shows names are rigid designators whose content cannot vary across worlds, undermining any descriptive sense that would differentiate co-referential names.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Frege's 'modes of presentation' are never given a satisfactory non-circular individuation criterion, making sense-based content distinctions explanatorily idle.
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    • 2.The informativeness of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is fully explained by epistemic differences in how agents acquire names, requiring no difference in semantic content between the names themselves.
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    Philosophy of Language

    Related

    Difference in mode of presentation constitutes a difference in senseDifference in sense constitutes a difference in contentFrege's 'modes of presentation' are never given a satisfactory non-circular indi...If two names share the same referent, they share the same semantic content, and ...
    +5 moreShow less
    Kripke's modal argument shows names are rigid designators whose content cannot v...Names are directly referential tags whose semantic content is exhausted by their...Names refer to objects via a mode of presentation, called a senseThe informativeness of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' is fully explained by epistemic ...Two names can present the same referent via different modes of presentation

    Similar

    Fregean semantics explains this apparent difference by positing that c...84%Two names can present the same referent via different modes of present...80%Frege's puzzle concerns cases where two co-referential names (such as ...80%Different modes of presentation associated with co-referential names c...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: meaning
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    The principal argument for Fregean semantics (which also motivated Frege himself) is the neat solution the view offers to Frege’s puzzle: the view says that, in cases like (19) and (20) in which there seems to be a difference in content, there really is a difference in content: the names share a reference, but differ in their sense, because they differ in their mode of presentation of their shared reference.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit