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    Two distinct possible worlds can share all the same conti... — Carmelics
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    Challenges→There is something (some proposition q) that explains the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (BCCF) of the actual world.

    Two distinct possible worlds can share all the same contingent facts while differing in which explanatory relations obtain between propositions.

    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Explanatory relations (grounding, causation) are distinct from the truth-values of propositions themselves.
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    • 2.Two scenarios can be physically/factually identical yet differ in which facts explain which—e.g., different causal orderings.
      ?

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    • 3.Explanatory structure is a genuine feature of reality not reducible to contingent fact distribution alone.
      ?

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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.If worlds share all contingent facts, they share all facts about what explains what, since explanatory relations supervene on facts.
      ?

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    • 2.Explanatory facts are themselves either necessary truths or contingent facts; there's no third category to differ in.
      ?

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    • 3.Allowing worlds to differ only in explanatory structure but not facts makes explanation metaphysically idle, not substantive.
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    Natural Theology1 linked

    Related

    Allowing worlds to differ only in explanatory structure but not facts makes expl...Explanatory facts are themselves either necessary truths or contingent facts; th...Explanatory relations (grounding, causation) are distinct from the truth-values ...Explanatory structure is a genuine feature of reality not reducible to contingen...
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    If worlds share all contingent facts, they share all facts about what explains w...There is something (some proposition q) that explains the Big Conjunctive Contin...Two scenarios can be physically/factually identical yet differ in which facts ex...

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    2 (1 for, 1 against)
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