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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
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    Unconstrained desire satisfaction accounts of value are i... — Carmelics
    Home/Virtue Ethics
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Unconstrained desire satisfaction accounts of value are implausible

    Truth & KnowledgeVirtue Ethics
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Nozick's experience machine thought experiment shows agents prefer reality over satisfied desires, revealing desires are not the ultimate locus of value.
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    • 2.If desire satisfaction were sufficient for value, plugging into the machine would be obligatory whenever it maximizes satisfaction, which virtually no reflective agent endorses.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Parfit's argument in Reasons and Persons shows that future-Tuesday indifference and other structurally coherent but substantively irrational desires satisfy desire-satisfaction criteria while generating absurd normative verdicts.
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    • 2.A value theory that cannot distinguish between temporally rational and irrational desire structures lacks the discriminatory power required of a serious account of well-being.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Desires can be directed toward things that are bad for the desirer
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    • 2.Desires can arise from mistakes or false beliefs
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    • 3.A value theory that licenses any desire as value-conferring would endorse manifestly bad or mistaken desires
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    Topics

    Virtue EthicsTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

    2 topics

    Moral Responsibility2 linkedSkepticism1 linked

    Related

    A value theory that cannot distinguish between temporally rational and irrationa...A value theory that licenses any desire as value-conferring would endorse manife...Desires can arise from mistakes or false beliefsDesires can be directed toward things that are bad for the desirer
    +3 moreShow less
    If desire satisfaction were sufficient for value, plugging into the machine woul...Nozick's experience machine thought experiment shows agents prefer reality over ...Parfit's argument in Reasons and Persons shows that future-Tuesday indifference ...

    Similar

    An unconstrained desire satisfaction view is implausible86%Life satisfaction theories are not fully adequate as accounts of happi...80%Neither desire, nor its satisfaction, nor sensing or believing that sa...80%Defining pleasure as the believed or sensed satisfaction of current de...80%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: value-pluralism
    View source passageHide passage
    However, it is not entirely clear that a view like Griffin’s is genuinely monist at the foundational level: the question arises, what is constraining the desires that qualify as value conferring? If the answer is ‘nothing’, then the view seems genuinely monist, but is probably implausible. Unconstrained desire accounts of value seem implausible because our desires can be for all sorts of things—we may desire things that are bad for us, or we may desire things because of some mistake we have mad
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit