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    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that Unconstrained desire satisfaction accounts of value are implausible

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Desires can be directed toward things that are bad for the desirer
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.Desires can arise from mistakes or false beliefs
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.A value theory that licenses any desire as value-conferring would endorse manifestly bad or mistaken desires
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Nozick's experience machine thought experiment shows agents prefer reality over satisfied desires, revealing desires are not the ultimate locus of value.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If desire satisfaction were sufficient for value, plugging into the machine would be obligatory whenever it maximizes satisfaction, which virtually no reflective agent endorses.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Parfit's argument in Reasons and Persons shows that future-Tuesday indifference and other structurally coherent but substantively irrational desires satisfy desire-satisfaction criteria while generating absurd normative verdicts.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.A value theory that cannot distinguish between temporally rational and irrational desire structures lacks the discriminatory power required of a serious account of well-being.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

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    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.