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Inverse View
It is not the case that Understanding probability in terms of frequency makes it impossible to have direct acquaintance with probabilistic connections between propositions.
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Reasons For
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1.
Frequency-based probability concerns complex contingent facts about the ratio of truth of one proposition relative to another logically independent one.
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2.
We do not have direct access to such complex contingent facts.
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3.
Such facts can only be known through extensive observation, data gathering, or empirical research.
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Reasons Against
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Reason against 1 of 2
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1.
On frequentist accounts (von Mises, Reichenbach), probability is defined as the limit of relative frequencies in infinite reference classes.
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2.
No finite observer can directly encounter an infinite sequence; acquaintance requires immediate, non-inferential contact with its object.
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3.
Therefore, frequentist probability values are always theoretical posits reached by extrapolation, not objects of direct acquaintance.
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Reason against 2 of 2
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1.
Russell distinguished knowledge by acquaintance from knowledge by description: acquaintance requires a direct cognitive relation to a present object.
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2.
Frequency-based probability relations are abstract statistical facts about population distributions that are never themselves perceptually present to any single observer.
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3.
Any epistemic access to such population-level facts must proceed through inferential description, not the kind of direct phenomenal contact that acquaintance requires.
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