Vasubandhu's own Viṃśikā concedes that dream objects lack causal efficacy (arthakriyā), yet still grants them representational content, undermining the inference from content to external cause.

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Causal efficacy (arthakriyā)(as the criterion for what is real): The ability of something to actually produce an effect or make a difference in the world; the Sanskrit term means literally 'efficacy in accomplishing things.'
External cause(what some argue each contingent thing needs): Something outside of an object that makes it exist or happen; for example, a match is an external cause of a flame.
Representational content(as what explains how our beliefs can mean something): The ability of thoughts, mental images, or beliefs to be 'about' something in the real world—like how the thought 'it's raining' represents an actual weather condition.
Vasubandhu(the subject of the argument being discussed): An ancient Indian Buddhist philosopher (around 4th-5th century) who developed sophisticated theories about the mind and reality, particularly the idea that everything we experience might be mental constructs rather than external objects.

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