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    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    We are not obligated to be totally devoted and unconditio... — Carmelics
    Home/Justice & Punishment
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    We are not obligated to be totally devoted and unconditionally committed to each of two distinct beings

    Against an aspect of GodJustice & Punishment
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kant's categorical imperative grounds obligation in rational universalizability, not in the metaphysical possibility of perfect fulfillment toward multiple objects.
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    • 2.If two beings make structurally identical and mutually exclusive total-devotion demands, rational consistency requires we cannot universalize compliance with both.
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    • 3.Therefore, the impossibility of dual total devotion reveals a normative conflict, not a mere empirical limitation that 'ought implies can' dissolves.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Frankfurt's account of wholehearted commitment requires a unified volitional structure where higher-order desires endorse first-order ones without internal conflict.
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    • 2.Total devotion to two distinct beings with potentially divergent commands structurally fractures the will, making genuine wholeheartedness toward either logically precluded.
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    • 3.Obligations requiring wholeheartedness cannot arise toward objects whose joint pursuit destroys the very volitional unity wholeheartedness demands.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.'Ought' implies 'can'
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    • 2.It is impossible to be totally devoted and unconditionally committed to each of two distinct beings
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    Topics

    Justice & PunishmentAgainst an aspect of God

    Connections

    3 topics

    Free Will & Foreknowledge1 linkedModality & Possibility1 linked

    Related

    'Ought' implies 'can'Frankfurt's account of wholehearted commitment requires a unified volitional str...If two beings make structurally identical and mutually exclusive total-devotion ...It is impossible to be totally devoted and unconditionally committed to each of ...
    +4 moreShow less
    Kant's categorical imperative grounds obligation in rational universalizability,...Obligations requiring wholeheartedness cannot arise toward objects whose joint p...

    Similar

    It is impossible to be totally devoted and unconditionally committed t...89%Morris's objection that unconditional commitment to two distinct being...80%A is obligated to do X unless B consents to X's not being done71%Society's obligations to provide for its members are limited, not open...71%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: monotheism
    View source passageHide passage
    There are at least two possible problems with this argument, however. First, the inference from 6 to 7 might seem suspect. For if “ought” does imply “can,” and it is impossible to be totally devoted and unconditionally committed to each of two distinct beings (as 10 says), then we aren’t under any obligation to do so. The truth of 10 implies the falsity of 7.
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    Therefore, the impossibility of dual total devotion reveals a normative conflict...
    Total devotion to two distinct beings with potentially divergent commands struct...
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit