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    We are very reluctant to accept that concreteness is a co... — Carmelics
    Home/Personal Identity
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    Challenges→The Linsky-Zalta view that concreteness is a contingent property should be rejected.

    We are very reluctant to accept that concreteness is a contingent property of objects.

    Modality & PossibilityPersonal Identity
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    Personal IdentityModality & Possibility

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    92%
    Linsky and Zalta claim that being concrete is a contingent property of...91%
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    The Linsky-Zalta account can explain the intuition that Bush might not...82%

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    SEP: propositions-singular
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    Matters are more difficult if one is an actualist, subscribing to the thesis that absolutely everything is actual. Then, if one accepts the existence of singular propositions, one has two options. First, one might deny that propositions like (7) are possibly true, accepting that necessarily everything necessarily exists, as Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta, in their (1994) and Timothy Williamson, in his (2001), do. This position is only as plausible as the explanation on offer of the intuitive co

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