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    Made withinDC&Austin
    The Linsky-Zalta view that concreteness is a contingent p... — Carmelics
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    The Linsky-Zalta view that concreteness is a contingent property should be rejected.

    Modality & Possibility
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    2 reasons for
    1 reason against

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke's modal semantics establishes that essential properties are those an object possesses across all possible worlds in which it exists.
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    • 2.Concrete existence—occupying spacetime, having causal powers—is not merely accidental but constitutive of what it is to be a physical particular.
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    • 3.If concreteness were contingent, abstract objects like numbers could become concrete, collapsing the fundamental ontological distinction Frege required between Sinn and object.
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    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Linsky and Zalta's view requires that merely possible objects are actually existing abstracta that contingently lack concreteness, inflating ontology beyond parsimony.
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    • 2.Williamson's necessitism, which Linsky-Zalta resembles, faces the decisive objection that it cannot explain why some necessitist entities have modal profiles radically unlike any concrete thing.
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    • 3.A view that treats concreteness as contingent cannot ground the asymmetric explanatory priority of concrete objects over abstract ones that causal theories of knowledge require.
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    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
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    • We are very reluctant to accept that concreteness is a contingent property of objects.
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    Personal IdentityModality & Possibility

    Related

    A view that treats concreteness as contingent cannot ground the asymmetric expla...Concrete existence—occupying spacetime, having causal powers—is not merely accid...If concreteness were contingent, abstract objects like numbers could become conc...Kripke's modal semantics establishes that essential properties are those an obje...
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    Linsky and Zalta's view requires that merely possible objects are actually exist...We are very reluctant to accept that concreteness is a contingent property of ob...Williamson's necessitism, which Linsky-Zalta resembles, faces the decisive objec...

    Similar

    We are very reluctant to accept that concreteness is a contingent prop...92%Linsky and Zalta claim that being concrete is a contingent property of...89%The Linsky-Zalta account can explain the intuition that Bush might not...85%Therefore, abstract objects, by definition, do not satisfy the conditi...78%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: propositions-singular
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    Matters are more difficult if one is an actualist, subscribing to the thesis that absolutely everything is actual. Then, if one accepts the existence of singular propositions, one has two options. First, one might deny that propositions like (7) are possibly true, accepting that necessarily everything necessarily exists, as Bernard Linsky and Edward Zalta, in their (1994) and Timothy Williamson, in his (2001), do. This position is only as plausible as the explanation on offer of the intuitive co
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (2 for, 1 against)
    Edits
    1 edit