We have gone astray in our understanding of how rules operate if we accept that interpretation is fundamental to meaning

Philosophy of Language

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1.Accepting interpretation as fundamental leads to an infinite regress of interpretations (as Wittgenstein notes: we can give one interpretation after another, each standing behind the last)
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2.Such an infinite regress entails radical linguistic indeterminacy
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3.Radical linguistic indeterminacy is an absurd consequence
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SEP: legal-reas-interpret

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(5) Whether or not interpretation is always of something which to some extent already has meaning, or whether interpretation is the fundamental determinant of the meaning of linguistic expressions in, for example, legal texts. Marmor 1992, 2005 & Stone 1995 deny that interpretation is the fundamental determinant of the meaning of linguistic expressions and contend that, following a certain reading of Wittgenstein's remarks on rule-following (namely the kind of reading offered by McDowell 198

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Type: claim
Perspectives: 1 (0 for, 1 against)
Edits: 1 edit