We have independent reasons for thinking Bert acts freely and is morally responsible: he satisfies ordinary real-life conditions and all conditions of the best compatibilist accounts
(Offered as a response to the traditional problem of free will)
The philosophical position that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism being true
free will(Kant's practical resolution of the third antinomy)
An exemption from the laws of nature; the power of doing and forbearing
moral responsibility(The author argues for a pluralistic understanding rather than a Kantian-exclusive one)
A normative concept whose scope is contested; the passage implies it encompasses at least Kantian notions (centered on individual rational agency) and other notions (potentially sociological, collective, or non-individualist in character)
After all, our grounds for saying that there is no relevant difference between the two is that the historical facts about Ernie’s creation (that he was created by a goddess, with the powers of a Laplacian predictor, with certain intentions, and so on) are not relevant to the question of whether Ernie acts freely or unfreely 30 years later. If they are not relevant, they don’t provide us with reasons for thinking that Ernie is unfree. By contrast, we do have reasons for thinking that Bert acts fr