Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    Home/Original/inverse
    See Original
    Inverse View

    It is not the case that We must distinguish between perceiving that p (which entails p is true) and perceptual seemings (where p might be false)

    ?Set your confidence on the premises below to see your aggregate.

    Reasons For

    2 perspectives
    Reason for 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.J.J. Gibson's ecological psychology shows perception is a direct pickup of affordances, making the seeming/perceiving distinction theoretically idle.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If perception is constitutively relational—world-involving rather than screen-like—there is no inner 'seeming' layer that could systematically diverge from the world.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.The distinction smuggles in a Cartesian veil-of-perception model that disjunctivists like McDowell and Hinton have argued conflates veridical perception with mere appearance.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reason for 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Wilfrid Sellars' critique of the Myth of the Given entails that 'perceptual seemings' cannot serve as epistemic foundations without already presupposing conceptual, hence fallible, commitments.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.If seemings are pre-conceptual, they lack the propositional form needed to bear truth-values; if they are conceptual, they are already subject to the same fallibility as perceiving-that, collapsing the distinction.
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Reasons Against

    1 perspective
    Reason against
    ?
    • 1.Perceptual experience is fallible
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 2.The world is not always as it appears to us in our perceptual experiences
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    • 3.We need a way of referring to perceptual experiences that allows for the possibility of the perceived content being false
      ?

      Think about whether this reason is strong or weak

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Strongest counterpoint
    Explore the most compelling reason on the other side.