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    We should admit no more causes of natural things than suc... — Carmelics
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    Home/Natural Theology
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    Supports→To the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes.

    We should admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.

    CausationNatural Theology
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    Natural TheologyCausation

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    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    Parsimony in causal explanation requires assigning the same causes to the same e...To the same natural effects we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes.

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    SEP: hume-newton
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    Now, if one accepts (i), then the problem of induction reveals two (related) problems: (a) one concerns the connection among sensible qualities, and (b) the other concerns the connection between hidden qualities and the visible qualities. So, if one accepts (i), one might have thought, for example, that routinely (if not exception-less) conjoined sensible qualities must always presuppose the same combination of hidden/invisible qualities that produce them. So, one could solve the problem associa

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