Skip to content
Carmelics
TopicsThinkersChangesContributorsLoading account…

    Carmelics

    A reasoning platform. Break down any belief into clear reasons, explore both sides, and weigh the evidence honestly.

    Navigate

    • Topics
    • Search
    • Recent Changes
    • Contribute
    • How It Works
    • Glossary
    • Thinkers
    • Contributors
    • About
    • Statistics
    • Terms
    • Privacy

    Database

    Statements
    —
    Perspectives
    —
    Topics
    —

    Press ? for keyboard shortcuts

    LoyalLoyalJusticeJustice
    Made withinDC&Austin
    Statements
    321,452
    Perspectives
    108,905
    Topics
    42
    When Player I plays R and Player II plays r2, Player III'... — Carmelics
    Home/Consequentialism
    HistoryEditSee Inverse

    Part of a larger discussion

    Supports→The fourth Nash Equilibrium (R, r2, r3) arises because Player III's entire information set is off the path of play when Player I plays R and Player II plays r2, making Player III's action inconsequential to the outcome.

    When Player I plays R and Player II plays r2, Player III's information set is off the path of play.

    ConsequentialismSocial Contract
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

    No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

    Sign in or register to share your perspective on this statement.

    Topics

    ConsequentialismSocial Contract

    Connections

    1 topic

    Causation1 linked

    Related

    Next step

    Based on where you are in your exploration

    Browse more in Consequentialism
    Related propositions within the same area of thought.
    The fourth Nash Equilibrium (R, r2, r3) arises because Player III's entire infor...When a player's information set is off the path of play, that player's action do...

    Similar

    The fourth Nash Equilibrium (R, r2, r3) arises because Player III's en...86%When a player's information set is off the path of play, that player's...77%If Agent A intends to play Up, Agent E's best response is to play the ...72%If Player II plays L at node 6, Player I's best response is to play L ...72%

    Source

    AI-extracted
    SEP: game-theory
    View source passageHide passage
    This game has four NE: (L, l2, l3), (L, r2, l3), (R, r2, l3) and (R, r2, r3). Consider the fourth of these NE. It arises because when Player I plays R and Player II plays r2, Player III’s entire information set is off the path of play, and it doesn’t matter to the outcome what Player III does. But Player I would not play R if Player III could tell the difference between being at node 13 and being at node 14. The structure of the game incentivizes efforts by Player I to supply Player III with inf

    Details

    Type
    premise
    Perspectives
    0 (0 for, 0 against)
    Edits
    1 edit

    Open for perspectives

    This idea is waiting for its first supporting or challenging perspective.

    Share the first perspective