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    Without a viable notion of truthlikeness, retaining truth... — Carmelics
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    Home/Skepticism
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    Without a viable notion of truthlikeness, retaining truth as the goal of inquiry makes partial progress towards it virtually impossible.

    SkepticismTruth & Knowledge
    ?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.
    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
    ?
    • 1.Partial progress towards truth requires a viable notion of distance from the truth.
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    • 2.If no viable notion of truthlikeness exists, there is no way to measure partial progress towards truth.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Kuhn and Laudan argue that historical science shows progressive problem-solving capacity without requiring inter-theoretic truth-distance comparisons.
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    • 2.Laudan's Problem-Solving Model explicitly replaces truth-approximation with empirical problem scope as the criterion of scientific progress.
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    • 3.If progress is adequately explained by problem-solving models, the claim that truthlikeness is necessary for progress is falsified by the historical record.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
    ?
    • 1.Pragmatist accounts (Dewey, James) ground scientific progress in problem-solving efficacy and predictive success, not proximity to a mind-independent truth.
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    • 2.A theory can demonstrably improve inquiry outcomes without any formal metric of distance from truth being invocable.
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    Related

    A theory can demonstrably improve inquiry outcomes without any formal metric of ...If no viable notion of truthlikeness exists, there is no way to measure partial ...If progress is adequately explained by problem-solving models, the claim that tr...Kuhn and Laudan argue that historical science shows progressive problem-solving ...
    +3 moreShow less
    Laudan's Problem-Solving Model explicitly replaces truth-approximation with empi...Partial progress towards truth requires a viable notion of distance from the tru...Pragmatist accounts (Dewey, James) ground scientific progress in problem-solving...

    Similar

    If no viable notion of truthlikeness exists, there is no way to measur...90%A viable notion of truthlikeness renders progress through a succession...88%In either case, the concept of truthlikeness serves no practical purpo...86%The concept of truthlikeness is useless for all practical purposes.86%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: truthlikeness
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    The quest to nail down a viable concept of truthlikeness is motivated, at least in part, by fallibilism (§1.1). It is certainly true that a viable notion of distance from the truth renders progress in an inquiry through a succession of false theories at least possible. It is also true that if there is no such viable notion, then truth can be retained as the goal of inquiry only at the cost of making partial progress towards it virtually impossible. But does the mere possibility of making progres
    Extraction notes

    Validity: Extracted via Max plan + API grounding/validity checks

    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit