Without universal instantiation of intrinsic essences, there is no principled basis for distinguishing natural kinds from interest-relative groupings, undermining the realist commitments motivating natural kind theory.

?Rate how convincing each reason is below to see the overall strength.

No one has weighed in yet. Be the first to share reasons for or against this statement.

Interest-relative groupings(in metaphysics and philosophy of language): Categories we create because they're useful for our purposes, not because the things in them share something fundamental—like 'things on my desk' or 'things that are heavy.'
Intrinsic essences(in metaphysics): The core properties that make something what it fundamentally is, regardless of how we use it or think about it.
Natural kind theory(in philosophy of science and metaphysics): A philosophical theory arguing that nature divides into real, objective categories with deep similarities, rather than categories we just happen to invent.
Universal Instantiation(first-order and temporal logic): The logical scheme ∀xφ(x) → φ(τ), where τ is any term free for substitution for x in φ, allowing one to infer a specific instance from a universal generalization

Based on where you are in your exploration