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    The essences of natural kinds need be neither intrinsic n... — Carmelics
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    The essences of natural kinds need be neither intrinsic nor possessed by all and only members of those kinds.

    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge
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    1 reason for
    2 reasons against

    Reasons For

    1 perspective
    Reason for
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    • 1.Natural kinds should be understood as kinds that support induction and explanation.
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    • 2.Generalisations supporting induction and explanation need not be exceptionless.
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    • 3.Essences that are intrinsic and universally shared by all and only members are not required for inductive and explanatory roles.
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    Reasons Against

    2 perspectives
    Reason against 1 of 2
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    • 1.Kripke and Putnam established that natural kind terms are rigid designators picking out kinds by their intrinsic microstructural properties.
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    • 2.If kind membership is fixed by rigid designation to intrinsic structure, then essences must be intrinsic to ground the reference relation itself.
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    • 3.A theory of essence that severs the link between intrinsic properties and kind membership undermines the semantic stability that makes natural kind terms informative across possible worlds.
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    Reason against 2 of 2
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    • 1.Brian Ellis's scientific essentialism holds that the causal powers constituting a natural kind's essence are universally and necessarily instantiated by every member of that kind.
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    • 2.If essences were not universally shared by all members, the modal necessity distinguishing genuine natural kinds from merely nominal or conventional kinds would collapse.
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    • 3.Without universal instantiation of intrinsic essences, there is no principled basis for distinguishing natural kinds from interest-relative groupings, undermining the realist commitments motivating natural kind theory.
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    Philosophy of LanguageTruth & Knowledge

    Connections

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    Causation3 linked

    Related

    A theory of essence that severs the link between intrinsic properties and kind m...Brian Ellis's scientific essentialism holds that the causal powers constituting ...Essences that are intrinsic and universally shared by all and only members are n...Generalisations supporting induction and explanation need not be exceptionless.
    +5 moreShow less
    If essences were not universally shared by all members, the modal necessity dist...If kind membership is fixed by rigid designation to intrinsic structure, then es...Kripke and Putnam established that natural kind terms are rigid designators pick...Natural kinds should be understood as kinds that support induction and explanati...Without universal instantiation of intrinsic essences, there is no principled ba...

    Similar

    Natural kinds require distinctive intrinsic natural properties common ...85%The arguments of Kripke and Putnam establish only partial essences, no...85%Kripke and Putnam imply that natural kind essences are microstructural...83%Species are not natural kinds, or the view that kindhood is fixed by i...82%

    Source

    AI-extracted1/3 agreementValid
    SEP: human-nature
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    There has, however, been a move in general philosophy of science that, if acceptable, would transform the relationship between the taxonomic and explanatory features of species. This move was influentially initiated by Richard Boyd (1999a). It begins with the claim that the attempt to define natural kinds in terms of spatiotemporally unrestricted, intrinsic, necessary and sufficient conditions is a hangover from empiricism that should be abandoned by realist metaphysics. Instead, natural kinds s
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    Details

    Type
    claim
    Perspectives
    3 (1 for, 2 against)
    Edits
    1 edit