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    Andrés Perea — Carmelics
    Thinkers/Andrés Perea
    AP

    Andrés Perea

    contemporaryEpistemic Game Theory

    Andrés Perea is a contemporary Dutch game theorist and economist affiliated with Maastricht University, specializing in the epistemic foundations of game theory. His research examines how rationality, belief revision, and plausibility orderings govern strategic reasoning in both static and dynamic games. He is best known for systematically comparing and unifying competing epistemic frameworks—particularly those of Aumann and Stalnaker—to clarify what assumptions drive differing solution concepts.

    Notable Achievements

    1

    Authored Epistemic Game Theory: Reasoning and Choice (Cambridge University Press, 2012), a foundational textbook in the field

    2

    Developed formal analyses distinguishing Aumann's and Stalnaker's models of rationality, identifying the structural assumptions behind their divergent conclusions

    3

    Advanced the theory of plausibility orderings and belief revision in sequential games under actual play

    4

    Contributed to rigorous treatments of iterated admissibility and common belief in rationality

    5

    Long-term faculty at Maastricht University's Department of Quantitative Economics

    Positions & Arguments(2)

    Skepticism

    claim

    The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path

    claim

    Plausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.

    Truth & Knowledge

    claim

    At a Glance

    Ideas

    2

    Topics

    2

    Era

    contemporary

    Tradition

    Epistemic Game Theory

    Topic Influence

    Truth & Knowledge2
    Skepticism2

    Related Thinkers

    David Lewis2 shared

    The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path

    claim

    Plausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.

    Immanuel Kant
    2 shared
    Boyd2 shared
    Brian Skyrms2 shared
    Stathis Psillos2 shared
    Bertrand Russell2 shared
    David Hume2 shared
    Aristotle2 shared

    Dive Deeper

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