b. 1942
Richard Boyd is an American philosopher at Cornell University, best known for his influential defense of scientific realism and his contributions to naturalistic epistemology and moral realism. His work on the explanationist defense of realism and the epistemic reliability of scientific methods has been central to debates about circularity in justifying epistemic practices.
Developed the explanationist defense of scientific realism (the 'no miracles' argument variant)
Originated the homeostatic property cluster theory of natural kinds
Pioneered Cornell moral realism, grounding moral properties in natural properties
Advanced arguments about rule-circularity and the legitimacy of track-record justifications for epistemic methods
Therefore something beyond rule-circularity must explain what is wrong with such arguments
premiseScientific theories tend to be hugely unsuccessful
premiseThe IWE self-justification argument leads to an utterly absurd conclusion
premiseIWE sanctions inferring to the worst explanation of the available data
premiseIf two arguments are structurally equivalent with respect to circularity, a charge of vicious circularity cannot distinguish them
claimIWE (Inference to the Worst Explanation) is a reliable rule of inference
claimBoyd's rule-circular argument for the reliability of abduction is not epistemically privileged over the absurd IWE self-justification argument
claimRule-circularity alone is not sufficient to identify what is epistemically problematic about self-justifying inference rules
premiseYet the IWE self-justification argument leads to an utterly absurd conclusion
premiseThese unsuccessful theories were arrived at by application of IWE
premiseThe IWE community's self-justifying argument cannot be convicted of vicious circularity any more than Boyd's argument for abduction can, if Psillos is correct
premiseThat IWE is a reliable rule of inference is the worst explanation of the fact that theories are so unsuccessful
premiseThe IWE self-justification argument is not viciously circular by the same standard that exonerates Boyd's abduction argument
Therefore something beyond rule-circularity must explain what is wrong with such arguments
premiseScientific theories tend to be hugely unsuccessful
premiseThe IWE self-justification argument leads to an utterly absurd conclusion
premiseIWE sanctions inferring to the worst explanation of the available data
If two arguments are structurally equivalent with respect to circularity, a charge of vicious circularity cannot distinguish them