b. 1953
Adam Brandenburger is a game theorist and philosopher of economics whose work centers on epistemic game theory — the formal analysis of how players' beliefs, knowledge, and reasoning underpin strategic behavior. He has made foundational contributions to understanding rationalizability, backward induction, and the role of common knowledge in equilibrium selection. His collaborative research, particularly with Eddie Dekel and Geir Asheim, clarified the epistemic conditions under which standard solution concepts (Nash equilibrium, iterated dominance) hold.
Co-developed the epistemic characterization of rationalizability via common belief in rationality
Clarified the distinct epistemic assumptions underlying Aumann's and Stalnaker's backward induction results
Advanced the use of lexicographic probability systems to model sequential reasoning in games
Contributed to interactive epistemology, formalizing how players model each other's beliefs
Long-term faculty at NYU Stern, shaping the epistemic game theory research program
The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path
claimPlausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.
The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path
claimPlausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.