Elijah Chudnoff is a contemporary analytic philosopher specializing in epistemology and philosophy of mind, with a focus on the nature and epistemic role of intuitions and perceptual experience. He is best known for defending the view that intuitions are a distinctive form of evidence, grounded in a phenomenological account of their presentational character. His work bridges analytic epistemology and phenomenology, arguing that certain mental states—including those with nonconceptual content—can justify beliefs directly.
Authored Intuition (Oxford University Press, 2013), a systematic defense of intuitions as evidence in philosophy and mathematics
Developed a phenomenological account of 'intellectual seemings' as presentational states that ground a priori justification
Argued that experiences with nonconceptual content can stand in genuine evidential relations to propositions
Advanced the debate on the relationship between perceptual and intellectual evidence in epistemology
Contributed to the literature on the epistemic roles of phenomenal consciousness
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