b. 1964
Alva Noë is an American philosopher known for his enactive approach to perception, arguing that perception is not something that happens in the brain but is something we do through skillful bodily activity. His work bridges philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and phenomenology, challenging traditional representationalist accounts of consciousness and vision.
Developed the enactive approach to perception, arguing perception is a form of skillful activity rather than internal representation
Authored 'Action in Perception' (2004), a foundational text for sensorimotor theories of consciousness
Co-developed sensorimotor contingency theory with J. Kevin O'Regan
Authored 'Out of Our Heads' (2009), bringing enactivist ideas to a broader audience
Professor of Philosophy at UC Berkeley, contributing to interdisciplinary dialogue between philosophy and cognitive science
Instead, we see what looks like a disk that is partly nearer and partly farther away from us.
premiseTo see an object's location and shape properties, one must receive sensory stimulations from that object.
premiseThe apparent shapes of perceived objects are not 2D but have extension in depth.
claimSeeing an object's location and shape properties is a two-step process requiring both sensory stimulation and retrieval of sensorimotor contingencies.
premiseIn order to see an object's actual spatial properties, it is necessary to understand how the object's P-properties would vary with changes in one's point of view
premiseTo see an object's location and shape properties, one must use those sensory stimulations to retrieve the set of sensorimotor contingencies associated with that object based on past encounters.
premiseThe enactive approach distances itself from the idea that vision is functionally dedicated, in whole or in part, to the guidance of spatially directed actions.
claimAppearances (P-properties) are perceptually basic in visual perception
claimThe enactive approach does not reduce vision to the functional guidance of spatially directed actions.
claimThe enactive approach's claim that perceiving 3D spatial properties requires first perceiving 2D P-properties is false.
premiseThe enactive approach holds that seeing an object's intrinsic 3D spatial properties requires seeing its 2D P-properties and understanding how they transform with changes in viewpoint.
premiseIn order to see an object's actual spatial properties, it is necessary to see the object's 2D perspectival properties (P-shape and P-size)
premiseWhen viewing a tilted coin, we do not see something that looks like an upright ellipse in either an epistemic or non-epistemic sense of 'looks'.
claimP-properties are not perceptually basic because we do not see 2D perspectival shapes when viewing objects from oblique angles.
premiseTherefore the proposed perceptual dependency of 3D properties on 2D P-properties is not borne out by perceptual experience.
premiseWe do not in fact perceive 2D P-properties when viewing objects from oblique angles — we perceive shapes with depth extension.
Instead, we see what looks like a disk that is partly nearer and partly farther away from us.
premiseThe apparent shapes of perceived objects are not 2D but have extension in depth.
claimSeeing an object's location and shape properties is a two-step process requiring both sensory stimulation and retrieval of sensorimotor contingencies.
premiseIn order to see an object's actual spatial properties, it is necessary to understand how the object's P-properties would vary with changes in one's point of view