Giacomo Bonanno is a contemporary economist and formal philosopher specializing in the epistemic foundations of game theory. He has made significant contributions to understanding belief revision, rationality, and knowledge in strategic interaction, particularly through the lens of modal and dynamic logic. His work bridges economic theory and philosophical logic, examining how agents form and update beliefs in sequential and simultaneous games.
Developed formal frameworks for belief revision in sequential games using AGM-style plausibility models
Analyzed the epistemic conditions underlying backward induction and forward induction in extensive-form games
Clarified the logical sources of disagreement between Aumann's and Stalnaker's models of rationality in games
Applied modal and dynamic logic to formalize notions of common belief and common knowledge in strategic settings
Contributed to distinguishing on-path from off-path belief updating in game-theoretic reasoning
The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path
claimPlausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.
The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path