James M. Joyce is a contemporary analytic philosopher at the University of Michigan specializing in decision theory, Bayesian epistemology, and philosophy of probability. He is best known for his accuracy-based argument for probabilism and his foundational work on causal decision theory. His scholarship bridges formal epistemology and rational choice theory, arguing that degrees of belief should conform to probability axioms on grounds of epistemic accuracy rather than Dutch book vulnerability.
Developed the accuracy-dominance argument for probabilism in 'A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism' (1998)
Authored 'The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory' (1999), a canonical treatment of causal vs. evidential decision theory
Advanced the use of proper scoring rules as a foundation for Bayesian norms
Defended the principle of maximum entropy as a principled, cautious constraint on prior credences
Contributed to the formal epistemology literature on the relationship between accuracy, coherence, and rational belief