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    Johan van Benthem — Carmelics
    Thinkers/Johan van Benthem
    Johan van Benthem

    Johan van Benthem

    contemporaryMathematical Logic / Dynamic Epistemic Logic

    b. 1949

    Johan van Benthem (born 1949) is a Dutch logician and philosopher at the University of Amsterdam and Stanford University, widely regarded as one of the leading figures in modal logic and its applications. He has been instrumental in developing dynamic epistemic logic and the formal logical analysis of games, information, and rational agency.

    WWikipedia

    Notable Achievements

    1

    Developed core frameworks in dynamic epistemic logic, formalizing how knowledge and belief change under informational events

    2

    Authored 'Logic in Games' (2014), establishing rigorous logical foundations for game-theoretic reasoning

    3

    Extended modal logic to cover temporal, epistemic, and deontic reasoning across diverse domains

    4

    Contributed to the formal reconciliation of epistemic logic approaches in debates such as Aumann vs. Stalnaker on backward induction

    5

    Co-founded and shaped the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation (ILLC) at the University of Amsterdam

    Positions & Arguments(2)

    Skepticism

    claim

    The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path

    claim

    Plausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.

    Truth & Knowledge

    claim

    The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path

    claim

    Plausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.

    At a Glance

    Ideas

    2

    Topics

    2

    Era

    contemporary

    Tradition

    Mathematical Logic / Dynamic Epistemic Logic

    Topic Influence

    Truth & Knowledge2
    Skepticism2

    Related Thinkers

    David Lewis2 sharedImmanuel Kant2 sharedBoyd2 sharedBrian Skyrms2 sharedStathis Psillos2 sharedBertrand Russell2 sharedDavid Hume2 sharedAristotle2 shared

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