Eric Pacuit is a contemporary philosopher and logician whose work spans formal epistemology, epistemic game theory, and dynamic logic. He is known for rigorous modal and logical analyses of rationality, belief revision, and strategic reasoning in multi-agent settings. His research has helped clarify foundational disagreements in game theory, including the Aumann–Stalnaker debate over backward induction and common knowledge of rationality.
Developed formal frameworks for plausibility models and belief revision in sequential games
Clarified the logical sources of divergence between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) on rationality and backward induction
Co-authored the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Epistemic Game Theory
Advanced dynamic epistemic logic as a tool for modeling information change in rational agents
Contributed to formal social choice theory and preference aggregation under uncertainty
The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path
claimPlausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.
The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path
claimPlausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.