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    Pacuit — Carmelics
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    Pacuit

    contemporaryFormal Epistemology, Dynamic Logic, Epistemic Game Theory

    Eric Pacuit is a contemporary philosopher and logician whose work spans formal epistemology, epistemic game theory, and dynamic logic. He is known for rigorous modal and logical analyses of rationality, belief revision, and strategic reasoning in multi-agent settings. His research has helped clarify foundational disagreements in game theory, including the Aumann–Stalnaker debate over backward induction and common knowledge of rationality.

    SEPStanford Encyclopedia

    Notable Achievements

    1

    Developed formal frameworks for plausibility models and belief revision in sequential games

    2

    Clarified the logical sources of divergence between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) on rationality and backward induction

    3

    Co-authored the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Epistemic Game Theory

    4

    Advanced dynamic epistemic logic as a tool for modeling information change in rational agents

    5

    Contributed to formal social choice theory and preference aggregation under uncertainty

    Positions & Arguments(2)

    Skepticism

    claim

    The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path

    claim

    Plausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.

    Truth & Knowledge

    claim

    The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path

    claim

    Plausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.

    At a Glance

    Ideas

    2

    Topics

    2

    Era

    contemporary

    Tradition

    Formal Epistemology, Dynamic Logic, Epistemic Game Theory

    Topic Influence

    Truth & Knowledge2
    Skepticism2

    Related Thinkers

    David Lewis2 sharedImmanuel Kant2 sharedBoyd2 sharedBrian Skyrms2 sharedStathis Psillos2 sharedBertrand Russell2 sharedDavid Hume2 sharedAristotle2 shared

    Dive Deeper

    Explore Truth & Knowledge→See Skepticism→