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    Carmelics

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    Statements
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    Perspectives
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    Topics
    42
    Peacocke — Carmelics
    Thinkers/Peacocke
    Peacocke

    Peacocke

    contemporaryAnalytic Philosophy

    b. 1950

    Christopher Peacocke is a British philosopher known for his influential work on the theory of concepts, philosophy of mind, and epistemology. His account of concept possession in terms of determination theories and possession conditions has been central to debates in analytic philosophy of mind and cognitive science.

    WWikipedia

    Notable Achievements

    1

    Developed a systematic theory of concept possession based on possession conditions and determination theories

    2

    Authored 'A Study of Concepts' (1992), a foundational work in the philosophy of concepts

    3

    Advanced the notion of nonconceptual content in perception

    4

    Contributed to debates on self-knowledge, rationalism, and a priori justification

    5

    Held chairs at Oxford, NYU, and Columbia, shaping contemporary philosophy of mind

    Positions & Arguments(5)

    Moral Responsibility

    premise

    Because the agent's aversive mood is fragile, the possibility of her trying to eat a red candy is a close one, so she also satisfies condition (ii).

    premise

    Despite satisfying both (i) and (ii), this agent lacks the ability to eat a red candy in precisely the same way as Lehrer's original agent.

    premise

    Peacocke's proposal requires that an agent satisfy both condition (i) and condition (ii) to possess an ability.

    premise

    An agent whose aversion to red candies is an unpredictable and temporary mood satisfies condition (i) for the same reason as Lehrer's original agent.

    Modality & Possibility

    premise

    Because the agent's aversive mood is fragile, the possibility of her trying to eat a red candy is a close one, so she also satisfies condition (ii).

    premise

    Despite satisfying both (i) and (ii), this agent lacks the ability to eat a red candy in precisely the same way as Lehrer's original agent.

    claim

    Peacocke's proposal is subject to modified versions of Lehrer's counterexample and therefore fails to overcome the sufficiency objection.

    premise

    An agent whose aversion to red candies is an unpredictable and temporary mood satisfies condition (i) for the same reason as Lehrer's original agent.

    Truth & Knowledge

    claim

    Peacocke's proposal is subject to modified versions of Lehrer's counterexample and therefore fails to overcome the sufficiency objection.

    premise

    Peacocke's proposal requires that an agent satisfy both condition (i) and condition (ii) to possess an ability.

    At a Glance

    Ideas

    5

    Topics

    3

    Era

    contemporary

    Tradition

    Analytic Philosophy

    Topic Influence

    Modality & Possibility4
    Moral Responsibility4
    Truth & Knowledge2

    Related Thinkers

    Immanuel Kant3 sharedDavid Lewis3 sharedAristotle3 sharedDavid Hume3 sharedBrian Skyrms3 sharedPlato3 sharedG.W.F. Hegel3 sharedIsaac Newton3 shared

    Dive Deeper

    Explore Modality & Possibility→See Moral Responsibility→