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    Pierpaolo Battigalli — Carmelics
    Thinkers/Pierpaolo Battigalli
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    Pierpaolo Battigalli

    contemporaryEpistemic Game Theory

    b. 1962

    Pierpaolo Battigalli is an Italian economist and game theorist known for his foundational work on epistemic game theory, particularly the analysis of beliefs, rationality, and strategic reasoning in dynamic games. He is a professor at Bocconi University and has made significant contributions to understanding how players form and revise beliefs during sequential interactions.

    SEPStanford Encyclopedia

    Notable Achievements

    1

    Developed the theory of strong rationalizability and belief revision in dynamic games

    2

    Co-authored foundational work on epistemic conditions for forward and backward induction

    3

    Advanced the framework of conditional probability systems for analyzing sequential rationality

    4

    Contributed to the integration of psychological game theory with epistemic foundations

    5

    Established rigorous models of plausibility orderings and belief hierarchies in extensive-form games

    Positions & Arguments(2)

    Skepticism

    claim

    The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path

    claim

    Plausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.

    Truth & Knowledge

    claim

    The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path

    claim

    Plausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.

    At a Glance

    Ideas

    2

    Topics

    2

    Era

    contemporary

    Tradition

    Epistemic Game Theory

    Topic Influence

    Truth & Knowledge2
    Skepticism2

    Related Thinkers

    David Lewis2 sharedImmanuel Kant2 sharedBoyd2 sharedBrian Skyrms2 sharedStathis Psillos2 sharedBertrand Russell2 sharedDavid Hume2 sharedAristotle2 shared

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