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    Robert Aumann — Carmelics
    Thinkers/Robert Aumann
    Robert Aumann

    Robert Aumann

    contemporaryGame Theory / Epistemic Logic

    b. 1930

    Robert Aumann is an Israeli-American mathematician and game theorist who shared the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for his work on conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis. He is best known for developing the theory of repeated games and for his agreement theorem, which formalizes when rational agents with common knowledge cannot 'agree to disagree.' His work bridges mathematics, economics, and epistemic logic, with significant influence on philosophical discussions of rationality and common knowledge.

    WWikipediaSEPStanford Encyclopedia

    Notable Achievements

    1

    Proved Aumann's Agreement Theorem (1976) on common knowledge and rational disagreement

    2

    Awarded the 2005 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for game-theoretic analysis of conflict and cooperation

    3

    Developed foundational theory of infinitely repeated games

    4

    Introduced the concept of correlated equilibrium in game theory

    5

    Pioneered formal models of common knowledge with applications to epistemology

    Positions & Arguments(1)

    Skepticism

    claim

    The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path

    Truth & Knowledge

    claim

    The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path

    At a Glance

    Ideas

    1

    Topics

    2

    Era

    contemporary

    Tradition

    Game Theory / Epistemic Logic

    Topic Influence

    Truth & Knowledge1
    Skepticism1

    Related Thinkers

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