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    Carmelics

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    Roy — Carmelics
    Thinkers/Roy
    R

    Roy

    contemporaryFormal Epistemology / Dynamic Epistemic Logic

    Olivier Roy is a contemporary philosopher working at the intersection of formal epistemology, dynamic epistemic logic, and game theory. His research investigates belief revision, rationality in sequential games, and the logical foundations of strategic reasoning. He has contributed to clarifying the technical and conceptual differences between competing formal models of rationality, particularly those of Robert Aumann and Robert Stalnaker.

    Notable Achievements

    1

    Analyzed plausibility update semantics for sequential games and their interpretive consequences

    2

    Clarified the model-theoretic source of divergence between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) on backward induction

    3

    Applied dynamic epistemic logic tools to questions of strategic rationality

    4

    Contributed to the formal study of belief revision in extensive-form games

    Positions & Arguments(2)

    Skepticism

    claim

    The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path

    claim

    Plausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.

    Truth & Knowledge

    claim

    At a Glance

    Ideas

    2

    Topics

    2

    Era

    contemporary

    Tradition

    Formal Epistemology / Dynamic Epistemic Logic

    Topic Influence

    Truth & Knowledge2
    Skepticism2

    Related Thinkers

    David Lewis2 shared

    The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path

    claim

    Plausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.

    Immanuel Kant
    2 shared
    Boyd2 shared
    Brian Skyrms2 shared
    Stathis Psillos2 shared
    Bertrand Russell2 shared
    David Hume2 shared
    Aristotle2 shared

    Dive Deeper

    Explore Truth & Knowledge→See Skepticism→