b. 1955
Larry Samuelson is a contemporary game theorist and economist at Yale University whose work focuses on the epistemic and evolutionary foundations of strategic rationality. He has made significant contributions to understanding how beliefs, learning, and plausibility structures shape outcomes in dynamic and sequential games. His research bridges formal decision theory, epistemic game theory, and evolutionary models of behavior.
Developed foundational work on epistemic conditions for rationality in sequential games
Contributed to resolving debates between Aumann-style and Stalnaker-style models of common belief and rationality
Co-authored influential research on evolutionary game theory and long-run equilibrium selection
Advanced the formal analysis of plausibility orderings and belief revision in extensive-form games
Authored the widely used graduate text Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection (1997)
The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path
claimPlausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.
The difference in conclusions between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) is due to differing models of belief revision upon deviation from the backward induction path
claimPlausibility updates in sequential games during actual play differ in interpretation from plausibility updates used in pregame deliberation for Backward Induction.